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Abstract 
This paper develops a methodology to measure the degree of economic 
integration between nations that are members of an integrated area. We show 
that a fully integrated economic area (IEA) is characterized by three properties 
regarding the distribution of member shares of total IEA output and total IEA 
stocks of physical and human capital. We then show that the expected 
distribution of member shares within a fully IEA is a harmonic series, with the 
share distribution depending only on the number of IEA members.  This 
property is then used to develop a composite indicator of the degree of 
economic integration within an IEA that indicates the distance between the 
theoretical and actual distribution of shares: the closer is the actual 
distribution to the expected distribution, the greater the degree of integration.  
We empirically compute our degree of integration index for US states, and 
alternative regional trading agreements (e.g., EU countries, MERCOSUR, 
Bangkok Agreement, etc.) and a World comprising 64 countries. 
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1. Introduction 
The past decade has witnessed a surge of negotiating activity around regional 
trade agreements (RTAs) as numerous subsets of countries have sought deeper 
integration among themselves. The WTO expects close to 400 RTAs to be 
implemented by 2010.
1
 To date, the most notable examples of RTAs include NAFTA 
(United States, Canada and Mexico), the accession of 12 additional countries into the 
European Union (EU), and MERCOSUR.  However, there are several ongoing efforts 
to initiate or renew agreements among a variety of nations (e.g., Free Trade for the 
Americas, ASEAN).  On average, each trading nation is currently a member of six 
preferential agreements. However, the typical developed country of the Northern 
hemisphere is on average a member of thirteen agreements (World Bank, 2005). 
Geographically, free trade initiatives are unevenly distributed across various parts of 
the world. Regional economic integration has come late to East Asia, but its pace has 
accelerated since the creation of the WTO.  
The present “spaghetti bowl” of preferential treatments is a complex web of 
treaties and rules whose prospects for a reallocation of global production are 
fundamental, but not yet fully understood (Bhagwati, 2002).  The potential for greater 
mobility of productive factors within any given integrated area is increasingly 
powerful, not only because cross-border factor flows are becoming more important,
2
 
but also because the international trade literature has long recognized that cross-
border factor flows and trade in goods and services can be substitutes (Mundell, 1957) 
or complements (Markusen, 1983).  Hence, reduced barriers to the movement of 
goods and of productive factors within a RTA would be expected to affect the final 
                                                 
1
 See the WTO website for an update of existing and planned free trade initiatives. 
2
 The importance of factor mobility in many parts of the world is evidenced by the growing importance 
in many nations‟ balance of payments of remittances from abroad (e.g., International Monetary Fund, 
2004). Capital flows in the form of foreign direct investment continue to be important among 
industrialized countries and they are increasingly also being directed toward developing countries. 
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distribution of production across RTA members. Since integration is 
multidimensional, the measurement of its intensity is a challenging issue of 
considerable importance. This paper is an attempt at developing such a methodology. 
Quantification of the degree of economic integration within an integrated area 
generates fresh insights into a number of critical questions. First, it is important to 
evaluate integration efforts of major existing RTAs and to observe how these evolve 
through time.  Second, it allows for a comparison of the degree of economic 
integration across different RTAs since the coverage and depth of preferential 
treatments vary from one agreement to the other.  For example, some RTAs involve 
only traditional tariff-cutting policies while others include rules on e.g. services, 
competition, investment and migration, and further institutional arrangements like the 
European Monetary Union to adopt a single currency. The economic union of the 
United States is perhaps the most sophisticated form of integration, with member 
states unifying all economic and socio-economic policies. As a rule, it is believed in 
policy circles that the degree of integration increases with the intensity of policy 
harmonization. Finally, assessing the degree of economic integration for the world as 
a whole serves to quantify the effects of globalization. On the one hand, most WTO 
liberalization initiatives that emerged from the Uruguay Round went into force only in 
the mid-1990s. On the other hand, the architecture of an RTA is discriminatory since 
member countries seek to eliminate trade barriers among themselves but maintain 
those on imports from non-member countries, with numerous rules of origin also 
usually imposed to prevent the free movement of goods even within a RTA.  
Several empirical studies estimate the extent of economic integration by 
openness, often measured by the ratio of trade to GDP. Greenaway et al. (2001) 
extend these proxies to construct the so-called index of extended intra-industry trade 
 4 
that can distinguish between penetration of a market due to increased imports versus 
increased production by domestic affiliates of foreign companies. However, a trade 
measure is a narrow indicator of the changes brought about by a RTA, and for this 
reason broader measures of globalization have also been estimated.  For example, 
Andersen and Herbertsson (2003) use factor analysis to combine several variables 
believed to be indicators of globalization into a single indicator. Riezman et al. (2005, 
2006) use applied general equilibrium techniques to compute alternative metrics of 
the distance between free trade, autarky and observed (restricted) trade equilibria. Our 
point of departure relative to this literature is that we seek to measure the degree of 
integration within a given RTA. In addition, we consider forms of integration that are 
deeper than “globalization” in that the latter is considered a liberalization process that 
leads to “a reduction in the barriers - whether technological or legislative - to 
economic exchanges between nations” (Ethier, 2002). Our analysis expands on this to 
include also economic and socio-economic policy coordination.  
Our indicator of the degree of integration measures the distance between 
observed values (shares) of output and factor stocks across RTA members and the 
values (shares) expected theoretically to emerge within a fully integrated economic 
area (IEA), the latter being an integrated area in which goods and factors are freely 
mobile and policies are harmonized.  The theoretical foundation of our indicator uses 
the cross-country equalization of factor marginal products as the force driving the 
allocation of resources across IEA members, and we combine this with the latest 
developments regarding the increasingly observed empirical regularity of Zipf‟s law 
in economic data (e.g., Gabaix, 2008). Our framework yields three related theoretical 
predictions.  The first is that factor mobility among members of an IEA implies that 
each member‟s share of total IEA output will equal its shares of the total IEA stock of 
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each productive factor (i.e., its shares of total IEA physical and human capital). We 
call this theoretical outcome the “equal-share” relationship. The second prediction is 
that the distribution of output and productive factors across IEA members is expected 
to exhibit Zipf‟s law;3 this law establishes a specific relationship among member 
shares of output and productive factors, namely, that the e.g. output share of the 
largest member is two times that of the second largest member, three times that of the 
third largest member, etc. Of course, the question arises as to why Zipf‟s law will 
occur. In the literature, a central mechanism for the emergence of Zipf‟s law is 
random growth of shares, and similarly our explanation builds on the random nature 
of output and factor shares that arises from policy harmonization within an IEA. In 
this setting, we apply the results of Gabaix (1999) to infer that if IEA member shares 
evolve as geometric Brownian motion with a lower bound, then the limiting 
distribution of these shares will exhibit Zipf‟s law.  Thirdly, if Zipf‟s law holds, we 
show that the expected distribution of shares within an IEA is a harmonic series, 
where the shares of this series depend only on the number of IEA members. This 
allows us to derive, for an IEA of fixed size, the expected distribution of shares across 
IEA members. The closer the actual distribution of shares is from this expected 
distribution the greater the degree of integration within the given IEA. Our measure of 
the degree of economic integration reflects therefore the distance between expected 
and actual distributions. 
Given the potential importance of our metrics for future integration policies, 
we empirically compute our measures of integration for the 50 US states and the 
District of Columbia (hereafter called the 51 US states) and for different RTAs (e.g., 
                                                 
3
 Other recent theoretical and empirical contributions show Zipf‟s law to be an empirical regularity in 
international trade. For example, Hinloopen and van Marrewijk (2006) find that the Balassa index of 
comparative advantage obeys to the rank-size rule, and very often to Zipf‟s law. Also, the size 
distribution of exporters analyzed in Helpman et al. (2004) conforms roughly to Zipf‟s law. 
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EU countries, Andean Community, MERCOSUR, Latin American Integration 
Association, and Bangkok Agreement) and a “world” comprising 64 countries.4 The 
data generally cover the period from 1965 to 2000.  
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 derives the theoretical 
properties of a fully integrated economic area with respect to the distribution of output 
and factors across IEA members and the expectation that member shares of IEA 
output and factors will evolve randomly.  Section 3 discusses the implications of this 
randomness for the long-run distribution of output and factors across IEA members 
and the expectation that member shares will conform to a rank-share distribution that 
exhibits Zipf‟s law. Section 4 computes the theoretical shares and describes the data 
used to measure actual shares of our economic groups.  Section 5 provides a weak test 
of the equal-share relationship. Section 6 defines our integration measures and 
computes these measures for alternative economic groups. Section 7 summarizes and 
discusses the consequences of our findings. An Appendix discusses data methods and 
sources. 
2. Equality of Output and Factor Shares 
We consider an economy (or economic unit) that produces a single good by 
means of a constant return to scale production function: 
(1) ( , )t t tY F K H  
where Yt is the level of output, Kt is the level of physical capital stock and Ht is the 
level of human capital stock, all at time t. To facilitate interpretation we assume the 
production function takes the Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) form: 
(2) 
1/
(1 )t t tY K H  
                                                 
4
 This is the scenario dreamed of by ideological organizations like the Global Awareness Society 
International (GASI): “Globalization has made possible what was once merely a vision: the peoples of 
our world united under the roof of one Global Village”. See the GASI website, originally cited in 
Rodrik (1997). 
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where  is an efficiency parameter,  the degree of physical capital usage, and is a 
substitution parameter such that the elasticity of substitution between the two inputs is 
  1/(1 + . Given (2), the marginal product of physical capital is: 
(3) 
(1 )/
(1 ) tKt
t
K
F
H
 
Combining (2) and (3) one can write: 
(4) 
1
t
Kt
t
Y
F
K
 
Similarly, the marginal product of effective labor (human capital) is: 
(5) 
(1 )/
(1 ) (1 ) tHt
t
K
F
H
 
or 
(6) 
1
(1 ) tHt
t
Y
F
H
 
We now introduce a second economy and consider the implications of 
allowing factor mobility between the two economies. We assume initially that the two 
countries share a common technology. Later in Section 4, we will extend our analysis 
to allow for technological differences and also discuss the implications of other 
assumptions.  
Assuming perfect mobility of physical and human capital between the two 
economies, and that goods are freely traded, we expect each factor to flow from the 
low-return to the high-return country until its marginal product is equalized between 
the two economies. For our IEA comprising two countries, this equality in real rates 
of return can be written: 
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(7) 
1 1
*
*
t t
t t
Y Y
K K
 
(8)  
1 1
*
*
(1 ) (1 )t t
t t
Y Y
H H
 
where „*‟ indicates second economy variables.  Due to the assumption of identical 
technologies, these expressions imply equality of average factor productivities (the 
inverse of unit factor requirements):  
(9) 
*
*
t t
t t
Y Y
K K
 
(10) 
*
*
t t
t t
Y Y
H H
 
Traditionally, the magnitudes in (9) and (10) serve as a basis for productivity 
calculations and comparisons across countries. However, unlike the existing literature 
(e.g., Hall and Jones, 1999) where productivity is measured by output per worker, 
equation (10) for human capital expresses (like the endogenous growth literature) 
productivity in terms of output per effective unit of labor. 
 We are now fully equipped to illustrate the implications of the model for the 
distribution of output and factors between the two economies. To obtain a first 
expression of our key relationship we note first that the ratio of (9) to (10) yields an 
equality between ratios of human to physical capital: 
(11) 
*
*
t t
t t
H H
K K
 
Since a common scaling of the levels of each factor in each country will leave the 
ratios in (11) unchanged, the equality of factor ratios in (11) implies also their 
equality to the ratio of the sum of their numerator terms to the sum of their 
denominator terms:   
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(12) 
* *
* *
t t t t
t t t t
H H H H
K K K K
 
Similarly, the equality of ratios in (9) implies: 
(13) 
* *
* *
t t t t
t t t t
Y Y Y Y
K K K K
 
Together, expressions (12) and (13) imply the following set of equalities: 
(14) 
* * *
t t t
t t t t t t
H Y K
H H Y Y K K
 
Relationship (14) indicates the distribution of factors and economic activity between 
the two economies of our IEA. Specifically, when technologies are identical and there 
are no barriers to factor mobility, each economy‟s shares of total IEA output, physical 
capital and human capital will be identical. We hereafter call (14) the equal-share 
relationship.
5
 
Relationship (14) extends easily to an IEA with l = 1,..., N members. 
Specifically, if all members have the same technology and there is perfect mobility of 
physical and human capital among members then the equalization of factor rates of 
return implies: 
(15) 
1 1 1
nt nt nt
N N N
lt lt ltl l l
H Y K
H Y K
 n = 1, …, N 
or SnHt = SnYt = SnKt in compact form, where Snjt represents member n’s share of the 
total IEA amount of variable j (j = Y, K, or H) at date t.  
The equal-share relationship (15) has implications regarding the relative 
economic performance of IEA members. For example, consider a reallocation of 
physical capital among IEA members that leaves the total IEA stock of capital 
                                                 
5
 Our framework also relates to the broad topic of output convergence since, if the equal-share 
relationship holds, it is clear that the two economies will have the same output per efficiency unit of 
labor. This implication is the essence of the productivity convergence hypothesis (Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, 2004), here interpreted in terms of efficiency units of labor and not per capita.  
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unchanged. From (15), any country that gains physical capital will experience an 
increase in the return to human capital and hence will accumulate human capital 
either on its own, or through an inflow of human capital from those IEA members 
whose physical capital was reduced. An IEA member that gains physical and human 
capital will subsequently increase its output, and hence also its share of total IEA 
output, to re-establish the equality of its output and factor shares as in (15). By the 
same reasoning, an inflow of foreign direct investment into one IEA member will 
increase that member‟s share of total IEA physical capital and its return to human 
capital, ultimately raising the country‟s shares of both total IEA human capital and 
total IEA output.  
In addition to insights regarding the effects of factor accumulation on the 
distribution of output among IEA members, equation (15) offers a key insight on the 
effects of pursuing coordinated versus independent policies within an IEA. To 
understand this, assume that IEA member n increases its human capital by a factor . 
It then follows from (15) that, as described above, this member‟s shares of total IEA 
physical capital and total IEA output will also increase.  In contrast, if all IEA 
members increase their human capital by the common factor  then all shares would 
remain the same. This suggests that the more harmonized (coordinated) are the 
economic policies of IEA members the more likely are member shares to be stable 
over time with, in the extreme, full harmonization implying that members‟ shares are 
constant over time.  In this case, any change over time in members‟ shares would 
arise only from random events such as innovation, resource discovery, natural 
disasters, civil unrest, etc. Since randomness of members‟ shares is more likely the 
greater the extent of economic and socio-economic integration among members, such 
randomness is more likely if members do not run independent monetary or exchange 
 11 
rate policies, fiscal policies are constrained by institutions, education systems are 
harmonized, and successful local industrial policies are rapidly imitated.  Accepting 
that changes in output and factor shares in a fully integrated economy will occur 
randomly, the question then arises as to the implications of this randomness for the 
long run distribution of economic activity across IEA members.  This is the subject of 
the next section.     
 
3. Long Run Distribution of Activity 
Our interest in the long-run distribution of activity within a fully integrated 
economic area is that it can serve as the benchmark for measuring of the extent of 
integration within a given IEA.  Toward this end, we adapt the specification and 
results of Gabaix (1999) to our setting to derive the implications of random shares for 
the long-run distribution of economic activity within an IEA. Specifically, Gabaix 
shows (his Proposition 1) that if the city shares of a nation‟s population evolve 
randomly as geometric Brownian motion with an infinitesimal lower bound then the 
steady state distribution of these shares will be a rank-size distribution that exhibits 
the property known as Zipf‟s law. This law implies the existence of a relationship 
between the values of a given variable (share) and the rank number of these values. 
This means, for example, that the population share of a nation‟s secondary largest city 
will be one-half the population share of its largest (first ranked) city. 
 Translating Gabaix‟s (1999) result to our framework requires the assumption 
that the evolution of an IEA member‟s output and factor shares can be approximated 
by geometric Brownian motion with a lower bound. Formally, this assumes that the 
growth over time in the shares of member n is captured by the following dynamic 
process: 
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(16)  
njt
t
njt
dS
dt dB
S
 
In this expression, Snjt > min( )njtS  is member n‟s share of variable j (j = Y, K, H) 
where min( )njtS is the lower bound, Bt is a Wiener process,
6
  is a drift parameter, and 
is the standard deviation of the distribution of shares. As in Gabaix, the distribution 
of the growth rates of shares is assumed to be common to all IEA members; this 
translates to assuming that the values of  and  are common to all IEA members. 
The specification of Brownian motion in (16) is only one of many ways to model 
random dynamics, but it has the property of being parsimonious in terms of number of 
parameters. The assumption of a lower bound on shares seems realistic in our context 
since important income transfers are institutionalized to prevent 
states/regions/countries from vanishing: relief programs are in place in case of 
disasters like a tsunami; the EU maintains a social fund and a regional fund.
7
   
 Accepting the above characterization for random shares, Gabaix‟s (1999) 
result allow us to conclude that the long-run distributions of IEA members‟ output 
and factor shares will exhibit Zip‟s law.  In our context, Zip‟s law implies the 
following relationship between the share values Snjt for a particular variable j (j = Y, 
K, H) and their rank number across IEA members:  
(17)  
1( )njt jt njtS R , n = 1,…, N; j = Y, K, H. 
                                                 
6
 The term dBt is the increment of the process. It is defined in continuous time as dBt = t(dt)
1/2
, where 
t is a stochastic term with zero mean and unit standard deviation, implying E[dBt] = 0 and Var(dBt) = 
dt. In discrete time, one needs to approximate the increment dBt. A possibility is to assume one or more 
shocks for each of the 365 calendar days of a year (dt = 1/365), in which case dBt is the running sum 
over all discrete increments (“shocks”). The drift is expected to be zero since the sum over n of the 
output and factor shares must be one. The standard deviation can be estimated using past and current 
observations. 
7
 Technically, the assumption of a lower bound on the output and factors shares is needed to obtain a 
power law distribution since, otherwise, the distribution of shares would be lognormal. 
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In this expression, Rnjt denotes the rank number of share value Snjt at time t, obtained 
by ranking shares Snjt  in descending order and assigning rank number Rnjt = 1 to the 
largest share value. Given this, expression (17) implies a specific relationship among 
shares, namely, S1jt/S2jt = 2, S1jt/S3jt = 3, S1jt/S4jt = 4, etc. Hence, as noted earlier, Zipf‟s 
law implies that the share value of the highest ranked (largest) economy is twice the 
share value of the second ranked economy, three times the share value of the third 
ranked economy, etc.  
Equation (17) provides the foundation for deriving the expected or long-run 
distribution of shares within a fully integrated economy.  First, note that (17) implies 
that Snjt = jt for the first ranked country (Rnjt =1) and hence that the constant jt (0 < jt 
< 1) is the share of variable j for the highest ranked IEA member. In turn, this result 
has implications for the equal-share relationship.  Specifically, if Yt = Kt = Ht then by 
definition the equal-share relationship holds for the largest IEA member. Given this, 
the proportional relationship indicated in (17) between any member‟s share and the 
share of largest IEA member (e.g., 2 1 / 2jt jtS S ) then implies that the equal-share 
relationship also holds each of the remaining IEA members. 
Besides the association between share values and their rank number as 
indicated by (17), it is possible to completely characterize the distribution of shares in 
a given IEA by exploiting the fact that the number of economies in a given IEA is 
finite and known. To show this, let Vnjt denote the level of variable j for member n and 
assume without loss of generality that member 1 has the largest value of variable j.  
Define njt as the ratio between member n‟s value of variable j and the value of 
variable j for member 1‟s at date t (i.e., njt = Vnjt / V1jt). Now order the values of 
variable j in descending order. Since 1jt = 1, this descending ordering of the values of 
variable j across the n = 1, …, N members can be written:  
 14 
V1jt 2jt V1jt 3jtV1jt .. Njt V1jt , j = Y, K, H. 
Since the total IEA amount of variable j is (1 + 2jt + 3jt + … + Njt)V1jt, (18) implies 
the following relations between member ranks and shares: 
(19) 
1
2 3
2
2
2 3
3
3
2 3
2 3
1
 1:   ;
1 ...
 2 :   ;
1 ...
 3 :   ;
1 ...
 N : .
1 ...
jt
jt jt Njt
jt
jt
jt jt Njt
jt
jt
jt jt Njt
Njt
Njt
jt jt Njt
Rank S
Rank S
Rank S
Rank S
 
  
Expressions (19) indicate that the ordered sequence of shares Snjt is a harmonic series, 
where each share value Snjt depends on the value of the δ’s and the number of 
members N. These expressions imply a specific relationship among 
shares:
1
1 2 2/jt jt jtS S , 
1
1 3 3/jt jt jtS S , 
1
1 4 4/jt jt jtS S , etc. Since the number of 
countries in a given IEA is known, knowing the values of the δs is sufficient to fully 
characterize this harmonic series. However, expression (17) characterizing Zipf‟s law 
also establishes a relationship among shares, namely, jt =1, 
1
2 2jt , 
1
3 3jt , 
1
4 4jt , etc.  If the rank-share relationship (17)  is constant (stable) over time then 
the δs will also be constant (stable) over time, in which case the harmonic series in 
(19) can be interpreted as a long-run relationship. We therefore denote the long-run 
theoretical shares by njS  and drop the time subscript. 
4. Data  
Having identified the long-run properties of a fully integrated economic area 
we are now able to construct the necessary values for our integration metrics. For 
each presumably integrated area, we consider two sets of data: 
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Theoretical shares 1 2, ,.......j j NjS S S     j=Y, K, H; 
Actual shares  
1 2, ,.......jt jt NjtS S S     j= Y, K, H. 
Given this, this section discusses the construction of these two share distributions for 
alternative economic groups. In particular, we consider the various regional trade 
agreements listed in Table 1. Our focus is on agreements that (1) are relatively old 
since their effects are supposedly imbedded in the data, and (2) are of sufficient size 
to obtain enough observations. We limit our sample of RTAs to those having at least 
four countries. 
Table 1.  Economic Groups 
Economic Group (start date) Member Countries
 
United States of America 50 US States + District of Columbia 
European Union (EU-14, 1975) 
Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United 
Kingdom 
Andean Community (CAN, 1969) Bolivia, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela 
Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR, 1991) Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay 
Latin American Integration Association (LAIA, 
1980) 
CAN + MERCOSUR + Cuba 
Bangkok Agreement (Bangkok, 1975) 
Bangladesh, China, India, Republic of Korea, 
Laos, Sri Lanka 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU, 1910) 
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, 
Swaziland 
Southern African Development Community 
(SADC, 1980) 
SACU + Angola, Mozambique, Mauritius, 
Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
World-64 
All countries above  + Australia, Canada, Chile, 
Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Hong 
Kong, Iceland, Iran, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, 
Kenya, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, 
Philippines, Sierra Leone, Switzerland, Syria, 
Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, United States 
 
Theoretical Shares 
As indicated in the previous section, the theoretical result that the long-run 
distribution of shares in a fully integrated economic area will exhibit Zipf‟s law 
means the theoretical shares in (19) can be computed once the number of members 
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(N) is specified.  Specifically, Zipf‟s law implies that 2j = 1/2, 3j = 1/3, 4j = 1/4, 
etc., allowing calculation of the shares in (19) for given N.. For example, the 
theoretical share values for the N = 51 US states are: 0.2213, 0.1106, 0.0738, 0.0553, 
…, 0.0043; for the N = 14 EU countries the theoretical share values are: 0.3075, 
0.1538, 0.1025, 0.0769, …, 0.0220; likewise for other country groupings. Table 2 
gives the distribution of theoretical shares for each grouping listed in Table 1.  
Table 2.  Distribution of Theoretical Shares 
Economic Group Theoretical Shares (Descending) 
US States 
0.2213, 0.1106, 0.0738, 0.0553, 0.0443, 0.0369, 0.0316, 0.0277, 0.0246, 
0.0221, 0.0201, 0.0184, 0.0170, 0.0158, 0.0148, 0.0138, 0.0130, 0.0123, 
0.0116, 0.0111, 0.0105, 0.0101, 0.0096, 0.0092, 0.0089, 0.0085, 0.0082, 
0.0079, 0.0076, 0.0074, 0.0071, 0.0069, 0.0067, 0.0065, 0.0063, 0.0061, 
0.0060, 0.0058, 0.0057, 0.0055, 0.0054, 0.0053, 0.0051, 0.0050, 0.0049, 
0.0048, 0.0047, 0.0046, 0.0045, 0.0044, 0.0043 
EU-14 
0.3075, 0.1538, 0.1025, 0.0769, 0.0615, 0.0513, 0.0439, 0.0384, 0.0342, 
0.0308, 0.0280, 0.0256, 0.0237, 0.0220 
Andean Community 0.4380, 0.2190, 0.1460, 0.1095, 0.0876 
MERCOSUR 0.4800, 0.2400, 0.1600, 0.1200 
Latin American 
Integration 
Association 
0.3414, 0.1707, 0.1138, 0.0854, 0.0683, 0.0569, 0.0488, 0.0427, 0.0379, 
0.0341 
Bangkok Agreement  0.4082, 0.2041, 0.1361, 0.1020, 0.0816, 0.0680 
Southern African 
Customs Union  
0.4380, 0.2190, 0.1460, 0.1095, 0.0876 
Southern African 
Development 
Community 
0. 3222, 0.1611, 0.1074, 0.0806, 0.0644, 0.0537, 0.0460, 0.0403, 0.0358, 
0.0322, 0.0293, 0.0269 
World-64 
0.2108, 0.1054, 0.0703, 0.0527, 0.0422, 0.0351, 0.0301, 0.0263, 0.0234, 
0.0211, 0.0192, 0.0176, 0.0162, 0.0151, 0.0141, 0.0132, 0.0124, 0.0117, 
0.0111, 0.0105, 0.0100, 0.0096, 0.0092, 0.0088, 0.0084, 0.0081, 0.0078, 
0.0075, 0.0073, 0.0070, 0.0068, 0.0066, 0.0064, 0.0062, 0.0060, 0.0059, 
0.0057, 0.0055, 0.0054, 0.0053, 0.0051, 0.0050, 0.0049, 0.0048, 0.0047, 
0.0046, 0.0045, 0.0044, 0.0043, 0.0042, 0.0041, 0.0041, 0.0040, 0.0039, 
0.0038, 0.0038, 0.0037, 0.0036, 0.0036, 0.0035, 0.0035, 0.0034, 0.0033, 
0.0033  
 
Observed Shares 
 An interesting feature of our data set is that it contains economies at widely 
different stages of economic development and integration, with a varying degree of 
data coverage. Among several data issues, two stand out. First, compared to the 
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existing literature, an important difference is that our approach deals with human 
capital (efficiency units of labor) instead of labor force. This is an additional element 
of difficulty in that a comparable human capital proxy is needed across countries and 
states, and across all periods. Human capital is multifaceted and includes a complex 
set of human attributes, and the stock of human capital embodied in individuals is 
therefore hard to measure accurately by any one number.  Educational attainment is 
considered the best proxy for the component of human capital obtained at school, and 
a country‟s population having at least a secondary level of education is now standard 
in models of human capital formation (e.g., Barro and Lee, 1993, 1996). Accordingly, 
we measure a country‟s stock of human capital as the number of persons having at 
least a secondary level of education. Earlier empirical studies use school enrollment 
ratios or literacy rates. These data are widely available but do not adequately measure 
the stock of human capital available as an input to production.
8
 The number of 
persons in a population who have successfully completed a given level of schooling 
seems a straightforward measure of the stock of human capital that reflects the 
attainment of skills and knowledge acquired through education. However, in practice 
there is significant variation across countries in the duration of each cycle of 
education. We therefore use the estimates in Barro (2000) which have taken into 
account this variation by using information on the typical duration of each level of 
schooling within countries. 
A second difficulty is data on stocks of physical capital. While data are readily 
available for some countries, for those with missing data we apply the perpetual 
inventory method to time series on real gross capital formation. For countries lacking 
data on depreciation rates, we use the average of the depreciation rates of countries in 
                                                 
8
 Earlier attempts to construct measure of educational attainment for international comparisons include 
Lau et al. (1991) and Nehru et al. (1995). Such measures are hindered by more limited coverage and by 
larger measurement errors (Barro, 2000). 
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the same RTA for which data are available. In what follows, we provide a brief 
description of the data used to construct each share value Snjt. The Appendix provides 
a more complete description of the data and methods. 
  For each of the 51 US states, output is measured by real gross state product 
(GSP). The physical capital stock of each state is estimated in two steps. First, an 
estimate of the total US physical capital stock in an industry is multiplied by that 
industry‟s contribution to a state‟s total income. Second, the industry physical capital 
stock estimates are summed across industries to obtain an estimate of a state‟s total 
stock of physical capital. The human capital stock of each state is measured by the 
number of persons in the state with at least a secondary education. Due to missing 
data, complete data for US states on all three variables (output, physical capital and 
human capital) are available only for 1990 and 2000, years in which the US Decennial 
Census was conducted.  However, output and physical capital stock data are available 
for other years. Where appropriate (e.g., when computing rank correlations) we use 
these additional years of data.  
With respect to the remaining economic groups listed in Table 1, the output of 
each member country is measured by its real gross domestic product as reported in the 
Penn World Tables 6.1 (Heston et al., 2002). Country physical capital stocks from 
1965 to 1990 are those reported in the Penn World Tables 5.6 (Heston and Summers, 
1991a, 1991b). However, data on EU country physical capital stocks for the period 
1980 to 2000 were also available from Timmer et al. (2003).
9
 We combined these two 
data sources to obtain a capital stock series for EU countries covering 1965 to 2000.
10
 
For most countries of the developing world, time series for the stock of physical 
                                                 
9
 The series forms the source of the OECD productivity database. See e.g., Schreyer et al. (2003) 
10
 We performed estimation using both sets of data for EU countries and found no qualitative difference 
in results when data are available from both sources (1980, 1985 and 1990). We will therefore report 
only the results using capital stock data from Timmer et al. (2003) during these three years.  
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capital were constructed using the perpetual inventory method applied to time series 
on real gross capital formation.  
Country human capital stocks are the number of persons aged 15 and over 
with at least a secondary education, as reported in Barro and Lee (1996, 2000). This 
over-15 age group better corresponds to the labor force for many developing countries 
than does the over-25 age group used in the earlier studies of Barro and Lee (1993, 
2000).  However, since data on rates of educational attainment are only available 
every 5 years the data sample was limited to five-year intervals from 1960 to 2000.  
 
5. Test of the Equal-Share Relationship 
 The equal-share predictions (14) and (15) are important concepts for the 
measurement of the extent of integration in an IEA since they provide a foundation 
for explaining the long-run emergence of Zipf‟s law with respect to output and factor 
shares. However, our earlier derivation of the equal-share relationship assumed 
economies differed only in their endowments of physical and human capital. Yet, this 
assumption can be questioned since the allocation of primary factors between 
countries may vary for other reasons. 
 Consider for example the case of technology differences where the parameters 
,  and  in (2) differ between economies. The equality of factor rates of return 
between two economies obtained originally in (7) and (8) can now be written: 
(20) 
1 1 *
*
*
*
( *) *t t
t t
Y Y
K K
 
(21) 
1 1 *
*
*
*
(1 ) ( *) (1 *)t t
t t
Y Y
H H
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where „*‟ indicates second economy variables. Given this, repeating the steps of 
Section 2 yields the following new expression for the equal-share relationship: 
(22) 
( *) ( *) ( *)
t t t
t t t t t t
H Y K
H H Y Y K K
 
where:  
 
1/(1 )
*(1 ) / (1 *)  (1 *) / (1 )  
1/(1 )( * / )v    
1/(1 )
*( *)  
Like (14), relationship (22) establishes a link between the first economy‟s shares of 
total IEA output, physical capital, and human capital, with differences in technology 
between the two economies implies a rescaling of the original variables.  For 
example, a difference between  and  indicates a neutral difference in technologies 
that has no effect on the optimal selection of physical capital and human capital, but it 
does have an effect on the distribution of output through . A difference in 
substitution elasticities introduces the power  whereas differences between the other 
parameters lead to a multiple rescaling of variables. The equal-share relationship in 
(22) simplifies to (14) when  =  * (  = 1), *  ( 1 , v = 1) and *  
( 1). 
 Deviations from (14) and (15) may arise for other reasons. For example, 
barriers to capital mobility may include political risk, capital controls, and tax 
differences that can hinder cross-border investments. Barriers to human capital 
mobility include government regulations on immigration and work permits, 
differences in pension systems and languages between countries. Such barriers to 
factor mobility can be analyzed by analogy to the above analysis since they introduce 
a wedge between marginal products. Other realistic situations could include differing 
endowments of natural resources, the presence of a non-tradables sector, etc.  Also, 
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the adding-up constraint of shares within each group may imply a non-linear 
relationship among them. Given this, whether (14) and (15) are too simple to capture 
a complex world is a matter of empirical verification, that is, the equal-share 
prediction may not hold exactly but may hold in a statistical sense.  
 To provide an indication of the potential empirical validity of the equal-share 
relationship, we can examine for a “weak” form of this relationship, namely, that 
there will be conformity between (pair-wise) rankings of the output and factor shares 
across members of an economic group. Table 3 provides evidence of this weaker 
proposition by reporting Spearman rank correlation coefficients for pair-wise rankings 
of the shares across our nine economic groups using year 2000 data. All rank 
correlations are positive except for SADC, and are significant in 18 of the 27 cases. 
High correlations are obtained for US States, Andean Community, EU-14 and LAIA, 
indicating conformity between (pair-wise) rankings. The correlation coefficients in 
the first column equal unity for three of the RTAs, indicating a perfect monotone 
relationship between output and physical capital shares. The rank correlations 
involving human capital are generally lower, showing less support for the equal-share 
relationship. This might reflect that human capital as a primary factor is of less 
importance in countries with unused resources and an ill-functioning labor market.  
 Despite exceptions, these results provide support for a “weak” form of the 
equal-share relationship. This finding may reflect that the equalization of marginal 
returns between countries is not used in absolute form but is instead transformed into 
ratios. For example, the ratio of (9) to (10) yields the ratio of human to physical 
capital in (11) and, using the properties of identities of ratios, we were able to derive 
(14). Hence, wedges between marginal products like tariffs and transport costs, which 
are ignored in our theoretical model but are present in the data, tend to cancel or 
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become weaker when ratios are used. Lastly, although the equal-share predictions 
(14) and (15) are not essential to our integration metrics, it is surprising to observe 
that RTAs with high (low) correlation coefficients in Table 3 are also those that will 
show a high (low) degree of integration, as indicated in the next section. 
Table 3.  Spearman Rank Correlations for Year 2000 
 * indicates when coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 1% level. 
 
6. Measures of Economic Integration 
 In this section we propose measures of the level of integration within any 
particular grouping of countries. Ideally, it is desirable to have a single measure that 
summarizes the distance between the distribution of actual and theoretical shares. In 
probability theory, Kullback-Leibler divergence (KLD) is used to measure the 
difference between two probability distributions (Kullback and Leibler, 1951). By 
analogy, KLD can be applied in our context to measure the distance between actual 
and theoretical share distributions. KLD is defined as: 
(23)  
, , 1
1
( : ) ln( )
3
N
nj
njt
j Y K H n njt
S
KLD S S S
S
 
Economic group Output-
Physical 
Capital 
Output-
Human 
Capital 
Human 
Capital-
Physical 
Capital 
US States 0.987*
 
0.981*
 
0.963*
 
EU–14 0.956* 0.820* 0.881* 
Andean Community 1.000*
 
0.900*
 
0.900*
 
MERCOSUR 1.000*
 
0.600
 
0.600 
Latin American Integration 
Association 
0.988
* 
0.830*
 
0.818*
 
Bangkok Agreement 1.000*
 
0.200 0.200 
Southern African Customs Union  0.200 0.000 0.400 
Southern African Development 
Community 
0.661*
 
-0.164 -0.176 
World – 64 0.724* 0.723* 0.464* 
 23 
In this formula, S
njt
 is the observed share value at time t whereas njS  is the 
time-independent theoretical share. Values of KLD range between zero and infinity. It 
is zero (complete integration) when the shares are pair-wise equal, i.e., nj njtS S  at 
date t  for all n and j. Otherwise, observed deviations indicate how far a group of 
economies is from full integration.  One drawback of the index in (23) is that it is not 
symmetric, in the sense that a deviation between an actual and theoretical share can be 
negative or positive.  This means that a zero value of KLD could arise either because 
the distance between the shares is zero, or because the shares are equidistant around a 
common mean. For this reason, the following symmetric version of Kullback-Leibler 
divergence (SKLD) is often preferred:  
(24)  
, , 1
1
( : ) ( ) ln( )
3
N
nj
njt njt
j Y K H n njt
S
SKLD S S S S
S
 
The values of the SKLD will be higher than those of KLD because all deviations 
between actual and theoretical shares in the SKLD index are measured positively. 
Table 4 presents the computed integration indicators (23) and (24) for US states and 
our economic groupings listed in Table 1 using data for the year 2000. As our 
measures (23) and (24) indicate the extent of divergence, we also invert their values to 
obtain an indicator of the extent of integration rather than extent of divergence; the 
inverted values of KLD and SKLD are denoted I-KLD and I-SLKD. The last column 
of Table 4 lists the value of I-SLKD for each economic group as a percentage of the 
value of I-SLKD obtained for the EU-14. The economic groups are listed in 
descending order from most to least integrated on the basis of our measures. 
 As Table 4 indicates, the EU-14 has the highest level of integration in year 
2000. This result is surprising, in that we expected US states to show the highest level 
of integration. For 1990 - the other year that human capital data are available for US 
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states - the values of I-SKLD are 9.13 for US states and 8.65 for the EU-14.  Hence, 
in 1990, US states were slightly more integrated than the EU-14. The rise in the EU-
14 level of integration may reflect a variety of factors internal to the EU-14 countries. 
The first is German re-unification which increased Germany‟s observed shares such 
that they became closer to the theoretical predictions. Second, Ireland‟s independent 
policies aimed at increasing the country‟s human capital and the country‟s 
attractiveness to inflows of foreign capital led to a re-ordering of its shares. Lastly, the 
1992 Single Market initiatives promoted further convergence in goods prices and 
factor rewards.  
Table 4.  Kullback-Leibler Measures, 2000 
Economic group
 
Kullback-Leibler 
divergence 
Integration 
indicator
a 
 
Integration  
relative to 
EU-14 
b
 
KLD SKLD I-KLD I-SLKD 
EU–14  0.050 0.099 20.00 10.10 1.00 
US States  0.064 0.125 15.63 8.00 0.79 
Andean Community  0.080 0.155 12.50 6.45 0.64 
Latin American Integration 
Association  
0.132 0.239 7.58 4.18 0.41 
Southern African Development 
Community 
0.418 0.681 2.39 1.47 0.15 
Southern African Customs Union 0.556 0.969 1.80 1.03 0.10 
Bangkok Agreement 0.670 1.018 1.49 0.98 0.10 
MERCOSUR 0.762 1.234 1.31 0.81 0.08 
World – 64 7.349 9.118 0.14 0.11 0.01 
a
 inverse of Kullback-Leibler divergence. 
b
 value of I-SLKD for given group relative to I-SLKD value for EU-14. 
 
As indicated in last column of Table 4, the measured level of integration of US states 
is about 79% that of the EU-14. The Andean Community has the third highest level of 
integration at about 64% of the EU-14 level. The integration levels of the remaining 
economic groups then drops sharply, with the Latin American Integration Association 
and the Southern African Development Community being the only groups with an 
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integration level that is 15% or more of the level of EU-14. In this regard, the level of 
integration of several well-defined integrated economic areas such as MERCOSUR 
and Bangkok Agreement are 10% or less the level of integration indicated for the EU-
14. Finally, the “world” comprising 64 countries has the lowest level of integration 
with a value of about 1 percent of the value obtained for the EU-14. 
 
Table 5. Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov D-statistics
a 
Economic group Year Output Physical 
Capital 
Human 
Capital 
US States 
1990 0.216 0.216 0.235 
2000 0.235 0.275 0.216 
EU-14 
1990 0.357 0.357 0.214 
2000 0.357 0.357 0.214 
Andean Community 
1990 0.200 0.400 0.200 
2000 0.400 0.400 0.400 
MERCOSUR 
1990 0.500 0.500 0.500 
2000 0.500 0.500 0.500 
Latin American Integration 
Association 
1990 0.400 0.500 0.300 
2000 0.500 0.500 0.300 
Bangkok Agreement 
1990 0.500 0.500 0.400 
2000 0.500 0.500 0.600 
Southern African Customs Union  
1990 0.750 0.750 0.750 
2000 0.750 0.750 0.750 
Southern African Development 
Community 
1990 0.583 0.583 0.400 
2000 0.417 0.500 0.400 
World-64 
1990 0.453 * 0.563 * 0.500 * 
2000 0.438 * 0.500 * 0.484 * 
a 
Except for World-64, in no case can we reject at the 1% level the null hypothesis that actual and 
theoretical shares come from the same distribution; * indicates p < 0.01. 
 
While our measures do indicate the extent of the difference between 
theoretical and actual shares, one drawback of the Kullback-Leibler measures is that 
we cannot indicate if the difference in observed values are statistically significant 
(although we suspect the integration value computed for the World of 64 countries is 
significantly lower than that computed for any of the other economic groupings). 
Another drawback is that these measures do not indicate the extent of overall 
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conformity of the distributions of actual and theoretical shares, that is, whether the 
actual and theoretical shares come from the same distribution. To address this issue, 
Table 5 reports values of the non-parametric two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) 
D-statistic which tests, for each economic grouping, whether the actual and theoretical 
shares come from the same distribution. 
The KS test is a “goodness of fit” test whose D-statistic measures the maximal 
distance between two cumulative frequency distributions. In this test, the null 
hypothesis is that both sets of shares come from a common distribution against the 
alternative hypothesis that they do not. As the results in Table 5 indicate, we can 
reject the null hypothesis that actual and theoretical shares arise from the same 
distribution only for “World-64”.  This finding suggests that only relatively small 
values of our integration measures are indicative of limited integration within a given 
economic area.
11
  
 Figures 1 to 9 show the values of our integration measures I-KLD and I-
SKLD for each economic group at different points in time in order to visualize the 
trend in integration in different regions of the world.  Figures 1, 5 and 6 indicate 
that the EU-14 and Africa RTAs evidence the most substantial increases in 
integration over time. In contrast, Figure 2 shows the level of integration among US 
states remained relatively constant over time, notwithstanding some movement 
toward less integration in the 1990s as US states gained greater fiscal autonomy 
implying less fiscal coordination. Figure 3 indicates that the relatively high level of 
integration of the Andean Community indicated in Table 4 masks a marked decline 
in its level of integration over time. Similarly, Figure 7 indicates a general decline 
                                                 
11
 While popular, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic is known to have low power, meaning that it more 
often accepts the null hypothesis when it is false. However, it is possible to compute “delta-corrected” 
KS statistics to assess if our results reflect the low power of the standard K-S statistic (e.g., Khamis, 
2000). 
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in the level of integration among Bangkok Agreement countries. Finally, Figure 9 
indicates that the level of integration of our “world” of 64 countries increased only 
slightly over time. This finding is perhaps surprising, given the common perception 
that the processes of globalization have meant freer movement of goods and factors 
among countries. Yet, this results is perhaps less surprising than at first glance, 
since our theoretical requirements for complete integration include the complete 
harmonization of economic as well as social policies. 
[Insert Figures 1 to 9 about here] 
7. Conclusion 
This paper derived a set of specific relationships expected to arise between 
economies that are members of a fully integrated economic area (IEA). In this regard, 
a key relationship expected to hold for any IEA member is the equal-share 
relationship that links a member‟s shares of total IEA output and factors supplies. 
Given the equal-share relationship, it was then demonstrated that complete 
harmonization of economic and social policies across IEA members implied that IEA 
members output and factor shares would be expected to evolve randomly. The 
randomness of output and factor share was then shown to imply that the distribution 
of each share across IEA members would exhibit Zipf‟s Law. This result allowed us 
to develop a method for computing, for any IEA with a fixed number of members, the 
theoretically expected values of each IEA member‟s output and factor shares. These 
theoretical share values were then used along with actual observed share values to 
derive a measure of the level of integration within any economic group.  
For the year 2000, the values of our integration measures indicated that the 
group comprised of 14 “core” EU countries had the highest level of integration. US 
states had the next highest level integration, measured to be about 79% of the 
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integration level of the EU group.  The Andean Community ranked third in terms of 
its level of integration, measured to be about 64% of the integration level of the EU 
country group. The remaining country groups all evidenced substantially lower levels 
of integration, with values of our integration measures that were at most 41% of the 
value obtained for the EU group. The least integrated group was a “world” comprising 
64 countries, with a level of integration value only 1% the level exhibited by the EU 
group. A surprising finding was that the measured level integration of our “world” 
increased only slightly over time. Finally, formal statistical tests for the conformity 
between the theoretical and actual distribution of shares indicated that, except of the 
world of 64 countries, in no case could the hypothesis of non-integration be rejected.  
Apart of offering, for the first time, a numerical indication of the degree of 
integration, perhaps a key contribution of our analysis is to suggest that greater factor 
mobility and reduced barriers to the flow of goods between countries can be expected 
to lead to the emergence of the equal-share relationship. The latter, when coupled 
with harmonized economic and social policies, offers new insights into the 
distribution of economic activity in an integrated economic area and the relative 
growth performance of its members.  
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Appendix: Data Methods and Sources 
US States 
The output for each of the 51 US states is measured by real gross state product 
as reported by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
12
  These data were 
available yearly from 1990 to 2000.  
Estimates of state physical capital stocks were derived from BEA (2002) 
estimates of the total US physical capital stock in each of nine one-digit industrial 
sectors comprising all economic activity.
13
 State physical capital stocks were obtained 
by multiplying each industry‟s capital stock14 by that industry‟s contribution to state 
total income and summing the resulting values.
15, 16
  For each state, this calculation at 
time t can be expressed algebraically as  
9
1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i j ij i
j
K t K t Y t Y t  
In this equation, Ki(t) is the stock of physical capital in state i, Yij(t) is value added by 
industry j in state i  (i = 1…51), Yi(t) is state i‟s total value added, and Kj(t) is the total 
U.S. stock of physical capital in industry j (j = 1,…, 9). State physical capital stocks 
were computed annually from the years 1990 to 2000. 
State human capital stocks were derived from data on educational attainment 
by state taken from the US Bureau of the Census.
17
  Since census data on educational 
attainment are only available every 10 years, data on stocks of human capital were 
limited to two years: 1990 and 2000. 
                                                 
12
 Data on gross state product are available at http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/regional/gsp 
13
 The sectors (BEA code) are Farming (81), Agricultural services, forestry, fishing & other (100); 
Mining (200); Construction (300); Manufacturing (400); Transportation(500); Wholesale and retail 
trade (610); Finance, insurance and real estate (700); and Services (800). 
14
  Data on state physical capital stocks by industry were taken from US Fixed Assets Tables, available 
at http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn/faweb. 
15
 Data on annual state personal income are available at http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/regional/spi. 
16
 This procedure follows that used by Munnell (1990) and Garofalo and Yamarik (2002). 
17
  Decennial Census Dataset are available at http://factfinder.census.gov 
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EU Countries (EU-14) 
Total output of each country is measured by real gross domestic product 
(GDP) computed as the product of real GDP per capita (base year = 1996) and 
population.  Per capita GDP and population data were taken from Penn World Tables 
6.1 (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2002).
18
  These data on output cover the period 1960 
to 2000. 
Data on physical capital stocks were derived from Penn World Tables 5.6 
(Heston and Summers, 1991a; 1991b) which reports four data series for each country: 
1) population, 2) physical capital stock per worker, 3) real GDP per capita and 4) real 
GDP per worker.
19
  Country physical capital stocks were constructed as the product of 
the first three series divided by the last series.  Data cover the period 1965-1990.  The 
capital stock series for each EU country was updated to 2000 using data from Timmer 
et al. (2003).
20
  
Each country‟s stock of human capital stock was measured by multiplying the 
percentage of its population aged 15 and over with at least a secondary level of 
education by the country‟s total population. Data on rate of educational attainment by 
country were taken from Barro and Lee (2000).
21
 Data on rate of educational 
attainment were only available every 5 years, limiting data sample to five-year 
intervals from 1960 to 2000.   
Other Regions (Andean Community, MERCOSUR, LAIA, Bangkok, SACU, 
SADC) 
Output 
                                                 
18
  Penn World Tables 6.1 is available at http://datacentre2.chass.utoronto.ca/pwt 
19
  Penn World Tables 5.6 is available at http://datacentre2.chass.utoronto.ca/pwt56 
20
  This physical capital database is available at http://www.ggdc.net/dseries/growth-accounting.shtml 
21
 Others studies that have used the Barro-Lee data include, for example, Rajan and Zingales (1998), 
Ramey and Ramey (1995), Barro (1999), Easterly and Levine (1998), Hall and Jones (1999). 
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Total output of each country is measured by real gross domestic product 
(GDP) computed as the product of real GDP per capita (base year = 1996) and 
population.  Per capita GDP and population data were taken from Penn World Tables 
6.1 (PWT 6.1) (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2002).
22
  These data cover the period 
1960 to 2000.  Missing values for Botswana, Cuba, Laos, Namibia and Swaziland 
were obtained from Penn World Table 6.2. Missing values for Angola in PWT 6.1 
and PWT 6.2 for years 1997-2000 were computed from the World Development 
Indicators (WDI) database by applying the WDI growth rates of real GDP to the 
existing real GDP data in PWT 6.1. 
Physical Capital 
Country physical capital stocks were computed in three steps. First, for 
country n, real investment in each year was computed using the following formula: 
* * /100nt nt nt ntI rgdpl k pop   
Deta on the investment share of real GDP ( ntk ), real gross domestic product per capita 
( ntrgdpl ) and total population ( ntpop ) were taken from PWT 6.1.  Second, 
depreciation rates were obtained from PWT 5.6 for the latest year available, 1992, and 
for the following variables: 15% for producer durables; 3.5% for nonresidential 
construction; 3.5% for other construction; 3.5% for residential construction; 24% for 
transportation equipment.  An overall depreciation rate was then computed as the 
weighted average of the above depreciation rates with weights being the share of each 
type of investment in the total. This was done for Malawi, Mauritius, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela and India. For countries with 
lacking data on depreciation rates, the average of the depreciation rates of countries in 
the same trade agreement were used instead., The depreciation rate for Angola, 
                                                 
22
  Penn World Tables 6.1 is available at http://datacentre2.chass.utoronto.ca/pwt 
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Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland and Tanzania is 
the average of the depreciation rates of Malawi, Mauritius, Zambia and Zimbabwe; 
the depreciation rate for Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Cuba is the 
average of the depreciation rates of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela; the 
depreciation rate for Bangladesh, China, Laos, Sri Lanka and Korea Republic is the 
depreciation rate for India. 
 Given data on real investment and the rate of deprecation for each county, the 
stock of physical capital at time t was constructed using the perpetual inventory 
method: 
1 *(1 )nt nt nt ntK K I  
where Knt is stock of physical capital of country n at time (t – 1), nt  its depreciation 
rate, and its assumed that Kn0 = In0. 
For Angola, Botswana, Cuba, Laos, Namibia and Swaziland PWT 6.2 was 
used to obtain any missing values after conversion to base year 1996. Remaining 
missing values for Angola from 1997 to 2000 were obtained using United Nations 
data on Gross Capital Formation (base year = 1990) converted into 1996 values. 
Human Capital 
Each country‟s stock of human capital is measured as the product of its 
population aged 15 and over and the percent of its population aged 15 and over with a 
secondary level of education. This measure of human capital stock does not account 
for differences in the quality of schooling across countries.
23
  
 
                                                 
23
 Recent work has sought to improve on international measures of human capital. International test 
scores of students at primary and secondary levels provide useful information on the quality of 
education. The International Adult Literacy Survey is a very promising attempt to measure directly the 
skills of workforce for international comparisons. However, these measures are at present restricted by 
a limited sample that consists mostly of OECD countries (Barro and Lee, 2000). 
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Figure 1.   Trends in integration measures,  EU-14 
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Figure 2.  Trends in integration measures, 51 US States 
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a
 measures computed using only US state output and physical capital shares due limited availability of 
data on state level human capital.  
 
Figure 3.  Trends in integration measures, Andean Community 
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Figure 4. Trends in integration measures, Latin American Integration 
Association 
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Figure 5.  Trends in integration measures, South African Development 
Community 
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Figure 6.  Trends in integration measures, South African Customs Union 
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Figure 7.  Trends in integration measures, Bangkok Agreement 
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Figure 8.  Trends in integration measures, Southern Common Market 
(MERCOSUR) 
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Figure 9.  Trends in integration measures, World-64 
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